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Introduction : the corporation as a legal 
fiction 
The theme of fictions in law in the context of corporate and 
securities law raises some intriguing issues, and I am particularly 
grateful for the opportunity it gives me to rethink some of my 
previous work on corporate law. At one level, the topic of 
fictions in law is an obvious one for an Anglo-American 
corporate lawyer. One of the first principles of Anglo-American 
corporate law that students learn is that the corporation is best 
understood as a legal fiction. The principle is otherwise known as 
the doctrine of the separate legal personality of the corporation. 
This is the idea that law grants a corporation a legal identity that is 
separate from its owners or shareholders, on the one hand, and 
those who make decisions on its behalf — officers and directors 
— on the other. Thus, the corporation is a fictitious creation of 
law. The doctrine has had a tremendous rhetorical and persuasive 
power in legal thinking and everyday discourse about the 
corporation, and is an example of the power of legal fiction to 
constitute reality. People talk about corporate citizens, especially 
in recent debates about the social responsibility of corporations or 
ongoing debates about the criminality of corporations.' What I 
want to do in this talk is to interrogate that core assumption about 
the corporation, that it has a separate legal identity, not so much 
from the point of view of contesting the idea's philosophical 
elegance or its political consequences — both of which are 
indeed significant— but rather from the position that the 
doctrine, and its creation, the fictional corporation, is being 
increasingly undermined from within and without corporate law 
1 Academic discussion of the social responsibility of corporaUons .s 
traceable to the debate between Dodd and Bed* See^emck TODD For 
whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?", 45 Harv. L Rev. 1145i (1932), 
Adolf A BERLE, "For whom Corporate Managers are Trustees . A Note , 
Harv L Rev. 1365 (1932). For the corporate criminality debate, see John 
C COFFEE, "'No Soul to Damn : No Body to Kick : An Unscandalized 
Inquiiy into the Problem of Corporate ^ 
Review 386 (1981); Gilbert GEIS and Joseph DIMHJTC^ ShouldJVfe 
Prosecute Corporations and/or Individuals? , in Frank TmonTo 
SNIDER (ed.), Corporate Crime. Contemporary Debates, Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 1995, p. 72. 
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itself, such that doubt is cast on the sustainability of this core idea 
about the corporation. Having tried to demonstrate this 
disintegration, I want to suggest a couple of possible reasons for 
it. 
The legal personhood of the corporation is taken to have a 
number of consequences, well known to students of corporate 
law. Chief among these are the facts that the corporation can 
cany on business, own property, have rights, sue and be sued 
and have a perpetual existence. A further extremely important 
consequence is said to flow from the separate existence of the 
corporation, that is, the limited liability of shareholders for 
corporate debts.2 Since a corporation is legally separate from the 
shareholders who own shares in it, these shareholders are not 
liable for debts incurred by the corporation that it is unable to 
pay. This is the feature that distinguishes corporations from most 
other forms of business organization, like partnerships or sole 
proprietorships, and obviously works to protect assets of 
shareholders from being seized by the corporation's creditors. 
I. The history of the creation of the 
corporate legal form 
It is also widely believed by corporate lawyers that the 
discovery" of the legal fiction of the corporation's separate 
personality occurred in the English House of Lords case of 
Salomon v. Salomon in 1897.3 However, Paddy Ireland, who 
has written extensively on the history of the corporate legal form, 
points out that the process of recognition of the legal form of the 
corporation in England was a much longer one than can be 
encompassed in a single legal decision. The process began with 
The Joint Stock Companies Act of 18444 which applied only to 
what were called "joint stock" companies (what we would now 
Pu^^c" companies) and ended with the Companies Act 
1907,5 which extended the use of the legal form to all types of 
2 R.S.C. (1985), c. C-44, s. 45. 
3 Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.). 
4 The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, 1844 (U.K.), 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110. 
5 The Companies Act 1907, 1907 (U.K.), 7 Edw. VII, c. 50. 
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business firms. He attributes what was in fact a relatively slow 
rate of acceptance of the idea of the corporation as a separate legal 
entity in part to the fact that the increasing "centralisation of 
capital" represented by the economic form of the joint stock 
company was widely seen in negative terms. This was largely 
because of the violation it represented of the idea of individual 
responsibility for commercial obligations. Meanwhile, extension 
of the separate legal entity status to so-called "private" firms was 
spurred by liability fears flowing from the "Great Depression" in 
the last two decades of the nineteenth century. It took a 
significant amount of time for the idea of the corporation to attain 
respectability and it only attained this when the form could be 
used by partnership-type entities. So Ireland argues that two 
factors were crucial to the development and widespread use of the 
legal form of the company. On the one hand, its link to the 
success of the economic form of business enterprise, as an 
arrangement whereby small amounts of capital could be 
contributed to the large economic enterprises such as public 
utilities, canals and railways that developed during the industrial 
revolution, in part accounted for its acceptance. But even more 
importantly it was the link to the availability of limited liability for 
shareholders that ultimately secured its dominance.6 
II. Economic analysis of the separate 
personality doctrine 
In the contemporary analysis of Anglo-American corporate 
law, there is little doubt that neo-classical economics cuirently 
dominates the field as a theoretical perspective from which to 
describe and evaluate the norms of corporate law J Interestingly, 
those writing from this perspective are somewhat ambivalent 
about the importance of what is considered in legal doctrinal 
terms to be the distinguishing feature of a corporation its 
See generally P. IRELAND, "The Triumph of the Company Legal Form, 
1856-1914", in J. ADAMS (ed.), Essays for Clive Schmitthoff, Oxford, 
Ireland, Professional Books, 1983, p. 29. 
B.R. CHEFFINS, Company Law : Theory, Structure and Operario/^^ford, 
Clarendon Press, 1997; Frank H. EASTERBROOK and Dame R. FISCHEL 
The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Cambridge, Mass., Harvar 
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separate legal personhood. Some law and economics scholars 
argue that the doctrine of corporate legal personality is 
economically important because it allows "the capital for a 
business venture to be collected from a number of investors, over 
time, while avoiding the costs of transfer of the venture's assets 
when new participants are admitted, or existing participants 
depart."8 It also allows the business itself to be transferred on a 
more cost-effective basis through the transfer of its shares, rather 
than its assets. In other words, because what owners of a 
corporation own are shares of the company rather than a 
proportionate share of the assets of the company, ownership of 
the company can change without disruption to the affairs of the 
business, thus reducing transaction costs. It should be noted, 
however, that this rationale for the legal fiction of the corporation 
is really a rationale for developing the idea of the freely 
transferable share as an autonomous form of property, which is 
not an inevitable consequence of the separate legal personality 
doctrine.9 
On the other hand, other law and economics scholars such 
as Brian Cheffins argue that: 
those writing from an economic perspective attach little 
significance to the fact that as a matter of legal formality a 
company is a separate entity. They emphasise instead that a 
business firm is a focal point for bargaining relationships 
entered into voluntarily and thus operates as a "nexus of 
contracts."10 As such, a company resembles a market, which is 
8 D. GODDARD, "Corporate Personality — Limited Recourse and its Limits", 
in R.B. GRANTHAM and C.E.F. RICKETT (ed.), Corporate Personality in 
the 20th Century, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, p. 11 and 18. 
9 See generally P. IRELAND, I. GRIGG-SPALL and D. KELLY, "The 
Conceptual Foundations of Modem Company Law", in P. FITZPATRICK and 
A. HUNT (ed.), Critical Legal Studies, Oxford, Blackwell, 1987, p. 149. 
10 Examples of such accounts include : Ronald H. COASE, "The Nature of the 
Firm", 4 Economica 386 (1937) reprinted in Oliver E. WILLIAMSON and 
Sidney G. WINTER (ed.), The Nature of the Firm : Origins, Evolution and 
Development, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991; Michael C. 
JENSEN and MECKLING, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs, and Capital Structure", 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976). 
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a medium where buyers and sellers engage in free and willing 
exchanged 
These buyers and sellers include shareholders, directors, 
debtholders, creditors, suppliers, employees and so on. Cheffins 
is aware of the potential critique that parties such as shareholders 
and employees may not really bargain but act on a "take it or 
leave it" basis12 — or the opposite might equally be the case, 
especially in relation to employees —, but he still finds it helpful 
to "deconstruct the corporate entity and examine directly the 
relationships between the key participants."13 This allows the 
analyst to understand the corporation as an efficient mechanism 
for the development of bargaining relationships among 
participants who interact "on the basis of reciprocal [and 
presumably rational] expectations and behaviour."14 
III. How does a corporation act? 
The effect of the doctrine of separate personality, according 
to Klein and Coffee, is that both lawyers and laypersons reify the 
corporation.13 We think of it as being capable of acting, of 
owning property, and also, as other areas of law suggest, of 
paying taxes or committing crimes. Yet within corporate law 
there is a recognition that corporations may only act throug 
human agents. Corporate law solves in the following way the 
problem for action that it has created in recognizing the fictional 
corporation. It establishes categories of actors (i.e. directors and 
officers or managers) who operate the corporation. T is crea es 
quite a bit of conceptual difficulty, for who is to appoint these 
11 B.R. CHEFFINS, "Using Theory to Study Law: A Company Law 
Perspective", 58(1) Cambridge Law Journal 197-209 (1999). 
12 See Victor BRUDNEY, "Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, an t e 
Rhetoric of Contract", 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1403 (1985). 
13 B.R. CHEFFINS, loc.cit., note 11, 32. 
14 Id. See also Jonathan R. MACEY and Geof^y ^ MILLER Xorporam 
Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspect.ve", (1993) 43 V. of Toronto L. J. 
401. , .... 
, c W a Ki FIN and J C COFFEE JR., Business Organization and Finance . 15 W.A. KLEIN and J.L. Lurrnn jix , N York Foundation 
Legal and Economic Principles, 6 ed., wesmury, 
Press, 1996. 
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agents? The answer is that the owners of the company are 
required to appoint the directors/managers, but directors are 
agents (or principals) of the legal person of the corporation. This 
is operationalized by creating a fiduciary duty of directors and 
officers to act "in the best interests of the corporation" and to act 
with "care, diligence and skill" in the management of the 
company's affairs. These duties must be owed to the company, 
while acting on its behalf, since it is separate entity from the 
shareholders. It is the corporation which is the principal. Again 
law and economics analysis ignores the purity of the legal 
distinction between the corporation and its shareholders by 
talking about the idea of "agency costs", which is the idea that 
self-serving managerial conduct imposes costs, not on the 
corporation, but on shareholders, thus reducing the value of their 
investment. 
IV.  The decl ine  (and fa l l?)  of  the  legal  f ic t ion 
I've made the claim that the notion of the corporation as a 
fictional person is generally seen as firmly established in the legal 
and popular imagination. If there are some conceptual difficulties 
about how the corporation actually acts these have now been well 
settled. What I want to try to argue here is that the fiction is 
actually becoming increasingly untenable because of doctrinal and 
other analytical developments which, viewed collectively, work 
to destabilize the power of the fiction and suggest that the form is 
in fact much more fragile than might be thought. Specifically the 
fiction is being increasingly undermined from within the 
doctrines of corporate and securities law themselves. At least six 
or seven pressure points, I think, can be articulated. 
A. Jurisprudence on lifting the veil 
In the 1997 Queen's Business Law Symposium on "The 
Future of Corporation Law", William Friedman presented a 
paper16 where he considered the myriad of Canadian cases in 
16 W.P. FRIEDMAN, "The Limits of Limited Liability", in The Future of 
Corporation Law : Issues and Perspectives : Papers Presented at the 
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which courts have ignored the fiction of the corporate entity and 
assessed liability for a debt owing by the corporation against its 
shareholder(s), according to common law principles. These 
decisions have often been justified by judicial decision-makers as 
being necessary to produce "just and equitable" results in specific 
cases of contractual or tortious claims against corporations. Thus 
courts have "lifted the veil" of the corporation where there has 
been fraud involved, where the company was incorporated for 
"an improper purpose", where the company is really an agent of 
the shareholder, where a group of corporations are so connected 
as to constitute "a single economic unit" and so on. His review of 
these cases suggested, he argued, that there has been : 
a continuous expansion of the exceptions to limited liability in 
a rather inconsistent fashion depending on where a court decides 
the economic risk should fall. As the limits continue to 
expand, it becomes increasingly difficult to understand the 
original principle. ...It is no longer sufficient to simply advise 
that incorporation will suffice to limit one's liability to the 
investment being made.17 
Thus discretionary decision-making by courts, with the aim 
of doing justice in individual cases, has steadily encroached on 
the "purity" of the legal fiction. 
B. Creditors of small corporations request personal 
guarantees from the corporation's shareholders 
It is relatively uncontroversial that, as an empirical matter, 
creditors — often financial institutions — of small corporations 
routinely request personal guarantees from the corporation s 
shareholder(s). In other words, creditors contract around the 
legal principle of separate personality with its attendant 
implication of limited liability for shareholders, in order to 
attempt to secure their loan to the company. As a very hig 
proportion, numerically, of Canadian companies are in the 
category of small, closely-held companies, this is a practically 
Queen's Annual Business Law Symposium 1997, Toronto, Carswell, 1999, 
p. 1 [hereinafter The Future of Corporation Law]. 
17 Id, p. 24. 
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significant departure from reliance on the legal principle. On the 
other hand, in relation to publicly-traded companies, the 
Canadian phenomenon of control blocks of shares frequently 
being held in family-owned hands could also be used as empirical 
support for the argument that the legal separation of shareholders 
from the corporations they control is more notional than real.'s 
C. Personal liability of officers and directors 
An often-repeated concern about the context of corporate 
decision-making in Canada is the alleged frequency with which 
governments encroach on the principle of corporate separate 
personality by imposing personal liability on directors and senior 
officers of corporations, by means of statutory provisions both 
inside and outside the business corporations acts, for acts done 
on behalf of the corporation. While the suggestion that this state 
of affairs has resulted in a flight from corporate directorships has 
not been empirically substantiated in Canada, ^  it is true that this 
is an increasingly used form of sanction imposed by legislation. 
Examples include liability for impairing the solvency of the 
corporation, breaches of disclosure requirements of securities 
legislation, non-payment of employee wages, environmental 
offences, failure to fulfil obligations under pension benefits 
legislation, occupational health and safety offences, failure to 
deduct or remit employee tax liabilities and so on.20 On the 
common law side, the 1998 decision of Budd v. Gentra21 raised 
18 Diane FRANCIS, Controlling Interests : Who Owns Canada?, Toronto, 
C.B. Media Ltd., 1989, p. 70-71, cited in James GILLIES, Boardroom 
Renaissance, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1992. 
19 See however the 1996 Report of the Standing Senate Committee on 
Banking, Trade and Commerce (Kirby Report) which noted that "High-
pro i e resignations from the boards of significant Canadian corporations 
because of concerns over personal liability for corporate debts brought the 
issue to the attention of the media and the public at large." [at p. 12]. At 
footnote 39, the report noted that in 1992, the directors of Westar Mining, 
^an ir ines an^ Peoples Jewellers resigned over concerns about their 
liability. See also the report of the TSE Committee on Corporate 
overnance in Canada, Where were the Directors?, December 1994. 
20 tte CBCAbility °f direCt0rS under the CBCA< see actions 118 and 119 of 
21 (1998) 43 B.L.R. (2d) 27 (Ont. C.A.). 
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the spectre of the possibility of assigning personal liability to 
directors in the context of an oppression action. Insofar as these 
personal liabilities are imposed when directors are acting on 
behalf of the corporation, this is a further example of ignoring the 
legal implications of separate legal personhood. 
D. Breaking down of the significance of the separate 
legal identity of the corporation 
I have argued in other work that the pervasiveness of the 
so-called oppression remedy in corporate litigation is a testament 
to a breaking down of the significance of the separate legal 
identity of the corporation. This provision in federal and 
provincial business corporations statutes is a remedy available 
where an act of the corporation or its directors produces a result, 
or the business of the corporation has been carried on, or the 
powers of the directors have been exercised in a manner which is 
"oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards" the 
interests of security holders, creditors, directors or officers. 
Although the class of complainants is broadly cast, the legislative 
history suggests that the motivation was to give a remedy to 
minority shareholders of companies where directors' actions 
were oppressive to them, and there were limited exit options. The 
remedy has been successfully argued for in cases where directors 
have tried to "squeeze out" the minority shareholder by 
reorganizing the share structure of corporation22 or they have, 
through amalgamation, radically transformed the business 
interests of company" or where "managing shareholders have 
engaged in self-dealing at the expense of the corporation and the 
interests of some individual shareholders." Significantly, one of 
the unresolved issues about the scope of the oppression remedy 
has been whether it can be made available against shareholders ot 
the company. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Brant Investments 
22 Re Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp., (1983) 43 O.R. (2d) 128 (C.A.) 
[hereinafter Ferguson]. 
23 Palmer v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries of Canada, (1987) 37 B.L.R. 316 (Ont. 
H C), rev'd (1989) 67 O.R. (2d) 161 (Div. Ct). 
24 Neri v. Finch Hardware (1976) Ltd., (1995) 20 B.L.R. (2d) 216 (Ont. Gen. 
Div.). 
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Ltd. v. Keeprite Inchad been firm about the fact that no 
fiduciary duty flows from majority shareholders to the minority. 
However, the recent case of Stern v. Imasco26 in October 1999 
contained comments by Mr Justice Cumming to the effect that: 
[t]he source of the oppression will be from within the 
corporation. However, the source of the oppression can 
conceivably be from someone who is merely a shareholder. For 
example, it might be that a shareholder effectively controls 
corporate decision-making in a closely-held corporation through 
a shareholders' agreement such as to cause the wrongdoing.27 
What is the relevance of this discussion to my thesis about 
the increasing whittling away of the separate legal existence of 
corporation? The effect of oppression cases is that the directors 
can be fulfilling their fiduciary duties to the corporation but may 
still oppress complainants, thereby triggering a remedy. The 
remedy creates a situation where disputes among corporate actors 
can be litigated directly, rather than through the persona of the 
corporation as a derivative action or common law breach of duty 
would require. Courts in oppression cases look inside the 
corporate veil to assess the significance of corporate acts for 
individual shareholders. Arguments of directors or controlling 
shareholders that actions were taken in best interests of the 
corporation will no longer be dispositive arguments. Indeed, the 
extension of the language of "interests" to securityholders, 
creditors, directors or officers suggests, as I have said elsewhere, 
"that the corporation may be more accurately viewed as a site of 
competing constituencies [that comprise the corporate entity] 
rather than as a self-contained legal phenomenon."28 It could be 
argued that oppression is a remedy for "internal" corporate actors 
to seek against other internal participants. In response to this 
claim I would say that first, the definition of "complainant" is not 
limited to this, in that it includes registered or beneficial 
securityholders, director or officers or former directors or 
officers, the Director who administers the business corporation 
25 (1991) 3 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.). 
26 (1999) 38 C.P.C. (4lh) 347 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
27 Id., para. 95. 
28 M. CONDON, "Pandora's Box or Trojan Horse? Recent Developments in the 
Use of the Oppression Remedy under the CBCA", [1994/95] Meredith 
Lectures 466-469. 
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statute, or any other person who is a proper person to make the 
application. Second, a strict reading of the separate legal entity 
principle would require that even shareholders be considered 
"external" to the corporation. Indeed it is the shifting nature of the 
categories of "insiders" and "outsiders" to the corporation that is 
partly responsible for the incoherence of the separate entity 
principle. Thus shareholders are insiders for purposes of 
oppression but outsiders for purpose of limited liability. 
E. Recent developments in Ontario corporate law 
relating to takeover bids 
The next area I want to look at is the recent developments 
in Ontario corporate law relating to takeover bids. In the summer 
of 1998 two contested takeover bids were litigated in the Ontario 
courts which arguably also bolster the position that I have been 
taking here, which is that in more and more ways the separate 
identity of the corporation is being ignored in decision-making 
and legislation. The cases were those of CW Shareholdings Inc. 
v. WIC Western International Communications Ltd.,™ a decision 
of Blair J. in the Ontario General Division Courts and Fente 
Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp.,30 cci e y 
the Ontario Court of Appeal. Takeovers of course involve a 
situation where a "bidder", often someone who is already a 
shareholder of the corporation, makes an offer to aC(^ 
sufficient shares of the company so as to give that bjddercontro 
over the corporation. The offer is made directly to the target 
shareholders, in accordance with securities 'egjsat 
requirements about disclosure of the terms of offer griKuta 
lengths of time to consider the offer and equal consideration 
offered to all shareholders, and can be as ^u ilr^Thesftwc) 
directors of the company as it is to the shareholders. These 
decisions are interesting for a number of reas^s' s^ as Jhe 
facts that the court in both cases considered the standing ot a 
"bitter bidder" to be a complainant in an oppression action, the 
fSat bo£ «ses involved public coitions winch « o 
had been, controlled by a single family, but with much ot the 
29 (1998) 38 B.L.R. (2d) 196 [hereinafter WIC]. 
30 (1998) 44 B.L.R. (2d) 115 [hereinafter Schneider], 
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equity of the corporation provided by holders of non-voting 
shares, thus raising very familiar but difficult issues of intra-
shareholder relations, the fact that both cases involved the 
directors involved seeking to resist the takeover bid through the 
use of defensive tactics, and the rhetorical language used by Blair 
J., who talks about butterflies, stormy seas and tea parties to 
describe the events at issue — thus demonstrating a capacity for 
legal fiction-writing! 
The specific argument that I want to make here relates to 
the holdings in these cases about the duties of directors of a 
company faced with a hostile takeover bid. Commentators have 
argued that the effect of the decisions in WIC and Schneider has 
been to adopt "a form of the U.S. Delaware court's "Revlon 
Duty"3i in which once the directors of a company have decided 
that a takeover is inevitable, the duty of the board changes 
from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the 
maximization of the company's value at a sale for the 
stockholders' benefit. This significantly altered the board's 
responsibilities... the directors' role changed from defenders of 
the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the 
best price for stockholders at a sale of the company.32 
There is some ambiguity in the decisions of WIC and 
Schneider on the question of whether maximizing value for the 
shareholders requires an auction (i.e. finding competing bidders) 
to be held for the company. It is also the case, as Halperin points 
out, that a company with a single controlling shareholder cannot 
^ bi; in P^y"if that shareholder does not want to tender to a 
bid. But what is significant about these cases for present 
purposes, I think, is that it makes explicit the lack of separation 
between the corporation and its shareholders when it comes to 
irec ors judging the merits of a takeover. The consequence of 
the separate entity doctrine as it applies to directors' fiduciary 
duties is suspended m the context of takeover bids. In other 
31 Transactio^^p' 1116 R°1C °f the Tar§et's Directors in Unsolicited Control 
Uw SvmnnV at the 6th Annual Queen's Annual Business l^ pubySS7p:5F!,c""!, 0,L'W' Q,"*n'* "»»»• 
32 Id., p. 4. 
33 Id., p. 6. 
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words, the separate entity principle is not a completely accurate 
description of the reality of relationships among corporations, 
directors, shareholders in all contexts. 
F. The relationship between the bodies of corporate 
and securities law 
In many ways the whole corpus of modem securities 
regulation creates problems for the integrity of the idea of 
separate personhood. How to characterize the relationship 
between die bodies of corporate and securities law has been 
subject of amount of commentary, usually from the point of view 
of considering the alternative jurisdictional authorities and 
philosophies of regulation of administrative agencies vis-a-vis the 
courts.34 it is uncontroversial that securities regulation governs 
the issuing of securities by issuers to public investors, in large 
part through the mechanism of regulating the information that 
investors should have to assist them in making infonned 
investment decisions about buying and selling their securities. 
Thus the regulation does not apply to those issuers who operate 
businesses without selling securities "to the public" (i.e. private 
companies). On the other hand it regulates a broader category of 
business enterprise than corporations, including partnerships and 
trusts. But insofar as issuers are corporations, securities 
regulation is clearly about governing the relationship that a 
corporation has with its investors/shareholders. I would argue 
that in governing this relationship, the fundamental precepts of 
securities regulation ignore the question of the separate 
personhood of the corporation. For example, Klein and Coffee 
point out that the prohibition on trading by insiders (*•£• 
directors, officers or significant shareholders) on the basis of 
material undisclosed information, which is a symbolically-
significant aspect of securities law, suggests a recognition of a 
responsibility flowing from those directors or shareholders 
directly to other shareholders of the corporation with whom they 
34 See for example Schneider, supra note 30 and Patrick MOYER, The 
Regulation of Corporate Law by Securities Regulators: A ComPanson°f 
Ontario and the United States", 55(1) University of Toronto, Faculty of Law 
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might trade.35 In other words, the prohibition against insider 
trading does not exist because the company would be thereby 
harmed by the insider's activities, but because other shareholders 
would be In relation to takeover bids and defensive tactics, the 
animating logic of securities regulators' interventions is m terms 
of preventing abuse of shareholder rights. This is seen as 
paramount over a discussion of whether a board is acting in the 
best interests of the company. By adopting this stance, shares 
become a commodity which is tradable in spite of the implications 
of that trading for the company itself.3* 
In another sense, securities commissions in all provinces of 
Canada are enabled to regulate and sanction issuers, as well as 
directors and shareholders of issuers, in the "public interest . The 
interpretation of the "public interest" in these contexts tends to 
revolve around regulatory assessments of damage to the public 
credibility of, and confidence in the fairness of, the securities 
trading markets if particular transactions were to proceed or be 
prevented from proceeding. Such transactions have included 
takeover bids37, awarding stock options to key employees,33 and 
the issuing of securities using exemptions from the Acts 
requirements39 . The fact that trading in securities and issuer or 
investor decision-making about this or the treatment of takeover 
bids is considered by legislatures to be vested with a public 
interest means that relations among individual issuers, their 
shareholding and directorial constituencies are considered to have 
svstemic implications for the capital markets and will be treated 
accordingly by regulators. Individual contracting between an 
issuer and its investors, [or in the "secondary" markets, among 
investors], will be viewed in this more general context. These 
concerns about market credibility and efficiency are in part 
prompted by the fact that more individuals are becoming 
investors whether directly or by way of membership of mutual 
or pension funds. To reiterate, "private" exchanges between 
issuers and their shareholders are subordinated to a broader set ot 
concerns about the "public interest" in market behaviour. 
35 Id., n° 15, 153-154. 
36 S.L. HALPERIN, op. cit., note 31, 23. 
37 In the Matter of Canadian Tire Corp., (1987) 10 O.S.C.B. 857. 
38 Albino, (1991) 14 O.S.C.B. 365. 
39 Mithras Management, (1990) 13 O.S.C.B. 1600. 
OF BUTTERFLIES AND BITTERNESS? 141 
G. The standpoint of feminist analysis 
Finally, another quite different position from which 
questions have been raised about either the conceptual 
appropriateness or empirical validity of the separate personhood 
doctrine has been from the standpoint of feminist analysis. The 
set of claims made here is an aspect of the general feminist 
analytic preoccupation with interrogating the idea that law, in its 
categories and application, is gender-neutral. Feminist legal 
scholars say that this is a "fiction" about law that they seek to 
expose. Feminists who have addressed this issue in the context 
of corporations and corporate law have started from a number of 
different places. At a conceptual level, one version of feminist 
thought is critical of legal validation of separate corporate 
identity, on the basis that carving out spaces and categories of 
separation, autonomy and boundary-drawing is associated with 
masculinity and valued on that basis, while femininity is 
associated with the connectedness and altruism that allows the 
(male) autonomy to exists On an empirical level we are all 
familiar with the hand-wringing about the "glass ceiling and the 
dearth of women on boards of corporations as directors. Less 
than 10% of the directors of Canadian public corporations are 
women. On this issue, though, it can hardly be said that 
corporate legal norms about qualifications of directors have any 
role in explaining this gap, since the qualifications imposed by 
corporate law are typically minimal — involving prohibitions 
against being insane or bankrupt—, precisely in order to allow 
family members, including women, to be directors. 
However one more fruitful place to develop a feminist 
analysis is in the context of the family-run company. Many of the 
insights in this area have emanated from researchers in Australia, 
who have examined the role played by women as participants in 
family-run businesses. One of the major findings of this research 
has been an interrogation of the practical importance of legal 
distinctions drawn between "the corporation or the business 
40 P ENGLAND, "The Separative Self: Androcentric Bias in Neoclassical 
Assumptions", in M.A. FERBER and J.A. NEUION (ed.), Beyo"dEc°nom<c 
Man : Feminist Theory and Economics, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 1993, p. 37, at p. 40. 
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and other aspects of family activity.41 For example in empirical 
interview-based research conducted by Belinda Fehlberg into 
women's involvement in family businesses in England and 
Australia, she concluded that it was not possible for the women 
she studied to draw a sharp line between the business and the 
family. Rather the distinction is a blurred one. Thus she reports 
that she found evidence of "overlap between household and 
business financial arrangements"^. Also "women were often 
happy to do this [work for the business] because working in the 
business gave them a sense of joint enterprise with their husband, 
and provided a way of balancing work outside the home with 
domestic and child care responsibilities."43 Again, "involvement 
in the family business reflected the often passionate belief that 
marriage and business were intimately intertwined."44 Spender, 
as a result of her examination of corporate law cases which 
featured women as participants, asks whether contract, as law 
and economics scholars would have it, is really the "glue" that 
creates the family-run business?45 She examined corporate law 
cases reported in Australia over a six year time period for 
evidence of women's participation, and found that 75% of the 
women involved in such litigation were wives or de facto 
spouses of other protagonists in the litigation 46 
Returning to the jurisprudence on the oppression remedy in 
Canada, it is possible to see similar evidence of what are 
essentially family-based disputes being litigated as corporate 
disputes via oppression because there is a corporation involved. 
One of the foundational oppression remedy cases in Canada is 
Ferguson 47 which involved the Imax [Systems] Corporation at 
the time when it was owned by three heterosexual couples 
including the Fergusons. When they divorced, she contended that 
41 P. SPENDER, "Exploring the Corporations Law Using a Gender Analysis", 
3:1 Canberra L. Rev., 82-93 (1996). 
42 B. FEHLBERG, "Women in Family Businesses : English and Australian 
Experiences", Paper presented to the Corporate Law Teachers' Conference, 
p. 8 (1997). 
43 Id., p. 9. 
44 Id., p. 14. 
45 P. SPENDER, loc. cit., note 41, 95. 
46 Id., 87. 
47 Precited, note 22. 
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her ex-spouse did everything he could to squeeze her out of the 
company, including attempting to force redemption of the class of 
shares that she owned. She sought a remedy under the 
oppression provision, which was granted to her on the basis that 
the conduct was oppressive, even though it may have provided 
economic benefits to the corporation. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal said that, when dealing with a "close" corporation, the 
court may consider the relationship between the shareholders and 
not simply legal rights as such. In Ferguson, the "personal" 
relations between the two ex-spouses were clearly significant in 
the uses that were sought to be made of the corporate form. An 
even more interesting example, perhaps, is the M v. 7/48 case 
involving a lesbian couple which, as is well known, became a 
constitutional question of the definition of spouse under the 
Family Law Act A9 What is less well known is that M and H had 
run a business together, and as the relationship broke down, H 
began to operate the company "as though she were the sole 
owner, "so Epstein J. gave M a remedy under the oppression 
provisions thus providing her with the financial support denied 
by the application of family law principles. Other cases include 
those of Nanejfv. Con-crete Holdings^ where a son alleged that 
his parent shareholders tried to squeeze him out because they 
were unhappy with his choice of partner and his lack of attention 
to the business. To conclude on this issue, feminist-oriented 
research suggests that in the context of a family run business, the 
boundary between the company and the family is a very porous 
and malleable one. 
Conclusion : how to explain the breakdown of 
corporate form? 
If I am right that we are seeing something of a breakdown 
or minimizing of the legal parameters upholding the corporate 
fiction, how might this be explained? Why is it happening? One 
possible explanation is the one given by Glasbeek in terms of 
48 (1993) 50 R.F.L. (3d) 92 (Ont. Ct„ Gen.Div.). 
49 R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3. 
50 M. v. H., supra, note 48 at 95. 
51 (1995) 23 O.R. (3d) 481. 
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political philosophy. Liberalism can much more easily encompass 
the idea of individuals and individualism than it can deal with the 
idea of a collective. Thus, 
sovereign individuals, taking risks while they optimize their 
own resources, are at the core of our political and legal 
liberalism and of our market-based economic principles. The 
corporation is a fly in the ointment, because, by functional 
definition, it is a collective. It is a combination of capitals, 
both inorganic and human.52 
The contradiction between our political commitment to 
individualism and the empirical evidence of corporations as 
complex organizations is managed, according to Glasbeek, "by 
virtue of a great legal sleight of hand, which of course is to treat 
the corporation as an individual."53 The corollary of that position 
presumably would be to admit that all of the examples I have 
given of where the doctrine has been ignored or inconsistently 
applied or fails to accord with empirical reality are simply 
instances of the contradiction becoming unmanageable. From this 
point of view, the lack of consistency between the rhetoric and 
reality of corporate personality's existence is to be expected and 
will continue. 
Another possible explanation for the inconsistent 
application of the legal fiction is that it has in fact outlived its 
usefulness. This is partly because increasingly shareholders are 
themselves corporations or institutions such as investment funds, 
so individuals are sheltered from liability anyway.54 If we 
compare the current era to that when the corporate legal form was 
first instituted, what do we see? In the current era of mega-
mergers, it is no longer individual investors through whom we 
need to consolidate capital, but we need to obtain it from the 
resources of other collective, business entities.55 In so far as 
52 Harry J. GLASBEEK, "Comments on 'The Limits of Limited Liability'", in 
The Future of Corporation Law, p. 30-34. 
53 Id. 
54 P. BLUMBERG, The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law : The 
Search for a New Corporate Personality, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1993. 
55 See Thomas A. HOCKIN, "Institutionalization, 'Retailization' and Shifting 
Responsibilities : The Canadian Experience", in Hans BLOMMESTEIN and 
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limited liability for individuals investing in "public" companies 
was the raison d'etre of recognizing the corporation historically, 
this is no longer that significant a concern. Individuals who 
invest do so through the media of investment funds and pension 
funds, a strategy encouraged by the tax system and regulatory 
regimes. At the other end of the spectrum, legislative and 
contractual experience with incorporated partnerships or sole 
proprietorships already suggests a lack of reliance on the 
corporate legal form. So one provocative possibility is that we are 
seeing the decline of the corporate legal form because it is no 
longer congruent with the economic form of the corporation. 
Another even more speculative possibility is that it is the 
very focus on markets, which is promoted by law and economics 
scholarship, that has overshadowed the importance of individual 
business activities conducted through corporations. Remember 
that law and economics sees the corporation as a useful economic 
actor in so far as it mimics a market. Making this argument in 
detail would require showing that the legislative provisions and 
decisions I've discussed were animated by market-based 
principles, a task which I cannot embark upon in the confines of 
this paper. In general, of course, this argument accords 
significant power to the intellectual influence of law and 
economics to orchestrate change in the functioning of key 
economic institutions. All that I would say about that, in 
conclusion, is that the corporation itself has been a testament to 
the power of ideas, and of fiction, to change the world. 
Norbert FUNKE (ed.), Institutional Investors in the New Financial 
Landscape, OECD, 1998, p. 131-142, who argues that Canadian financial 
institutions, including pension funds, insurance companies, banks, trusts 
and mutual funds own an estimated 60 percent of all stocks listed on the 
TSE. 
